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We examine the impact of acquisitions by UK acquirers on executive pay. The overall sample
shows a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or
organizational form, although initial cross-border acquisitions result in higher pay. Pay increases
are higher following acquisitions of targets with high pay, but not high pay countries. CEOs are
rewarded equally for bad and good acquisitions, and those well rewarded are more likely to
reacquire. However, bad acquisitions do not increase CEO wealth because CEO shareholding
value declines. Pay impacts are not affected by the acquiring firms’ strength of corporate
governance.
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2INTRODUCTION
There is a popular perception that many mergers and acquisitions are carried out to increase size
in an attempt to increase compensation (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986). The empirical literature on
executive pay documents a strong link between firm size and executive pay, and a much weaker
link between pay and performance (Murphy, 1999). Consequently, making a firm larger by
acquisition could increase the compensation of an existing manager, regardless of whether the
acquisition creates value or not.1 The empirical literature on takeovers suggests that a majority
of takeovers neither improve profitability nor benefit acquirer shareholders (see, e.g., Hughes,
1989). This has been the motivation for the majority of studies that make up the large empirical
literature on the effects of M&A activity on executive compensation.
This literature, shows that acquiring firms are on average rewarded with higher absolute
compensation following acquisition (Khorana and Zenner, 1998; Bliss and Rosen, 2001;
Anderson et al., 2004; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Girma et al., 2006; and Harford and Li,
2007). Evidence on whether these pay increases are greater than would be expected from
internal growth is mixed. Firth (1991), Conyon and Gregg (1994), Khorana and Zenner (1998),
and Girma et al. (2006) find evidence in favour, whilst Avery et al. (1998), Bliss and Rosen
(2001), Anderson et al., (2004), and Harford and Li (2007) find evidence against. Evidence on
whether bad acquisitions also result in pay increases is also mixed. Lambert and Larcker (1987),
Khorana and Zenner (1998), and Girma et al. (2006) find no evidence of this, whilst Firth
(1991), Avery et al. (1998), Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Anderson et al., (2004) find evidence in
favour. The evidence on how poor acquisitions affect overall director wealth (pay plus
shareholding value) is mixed. Firth (1991) and Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that poor
acquisitions result in an increase in total CEO wealth, whilst Lambert and Larcker (1987) find
that the effect on CEO wealth is negative. If pay awards following acquisition are a
manifestation of agency problems, then pay awards should be constrained by sound corporate
governance. The evidence is, once again, mixed. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that CEOs
3receive significantly larger cash bonuses when the CEO is also the chairman and when the CEO
also sits on the nominating committee, whilst Anderson et al. (2004), find no evidence that pay
increases are related to either CEO share ownership or tenure.2
The extant literature exhibits a variety of sampling procedures and methodologies and is
clearly ambiguous in its findings. One significant drawback with this literature is that it focuses
on only one subset of acquisitions, those of domestic companies that are publicly listed. No
study has included, or examined the difference between, acquisitions of cross-border as well as
domestic targets, or acquisitions of private as well as public targets. These types of acquisitions
are quantitatively very important, accounting for a significant and increasing proportion of
takeover activity (Conn et al., 2005). There are also a number of reasons why pay impacts will
differ across these different types of acquisitions.3
Cross-border acquisitions may result in a more complex organisation due to factors such as
geographic dispersion, multiple currencies, and cultural differences (see e.g., Duru and Reeb,
2002). According to the matching theory (Rosen, 1992), multinational firms may bid up the
compensation of highly skilled executives because their managerial product is higher at such
firms. Alternatively, an increase in managerial compensation might follow the confirmation of
the multinational talent of the manager and putting it to the test at the newly merged entity.
Consistent with these arguments, previous studies show that executive pay is positively related
to international scope (Persons, 2001; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Ramcharran, 2002; and Thompson
et al., 2002).
Another reason that both cross-border and public acquisitions will have a more positive
impact on executive pay relates to the level of pay in the target company. Where the acquirer's
level of pay is lower than that of the acquiree, there may be a tendency for the acquirer's pay
levels to gravitate towards the acquiree's levels following acquisition. Maintaining separate
wage scales for executives could be difficult and interfere with integration of the operations of
the combined firms, and post-merger equality in compensation systems may be easier to achieve
through pay rises than through pay cuts. As shown in Figure 1 below, important international
4differences in compensation exist. In particular, CEO pay is significantly higher in the US than
elsewhere (see e.g., Murphy, 1999; and Conyon and Murphy, 2000). This is of particular
importance in the context of our sample, since US targets account for almost half of all cross-
border acquisitions by UK acquirers. Murphy (1999) argues that, “foreign companies acquiring
US subsidiaries face huge internal pay inequities, often resolved by increasing home-country
executive pay” (p.8).4, 5, 6 The same argument holds for acquisitions of public targets because
public firms tend to pay higher executive compensation than private firms (Ke et al., 1999).7
FIGURE 1 HERE
In this paper, we empirically examine the impact of a comprehensive sample of 4,528
acquisitions on the executive pay of 2,469 publicly listed UK firms over the period 1984-2001.
It is the analysis of this comprehensive sample, which includes foreign, domestic, public and
private acquisition targets, that marks our key contribution to the literature. One concern with
the extant literature is the generality of the findings, given that only a minority of acquisitions
are examined. Firstly, therefore, we provide findings on pay impacts which are robust to the
inclusion of all acquisition types. We find that acquisitions result in significant pay increases in
the year following acquisition, but that the increase is transitory and offset by a similar decline
two years after acquisition, possibly because the initial increase represents a one off bonus
payment. Secondly, we distinguish pay impacts according to target nationality and
organizational form and test the specific hypotheses described above. Such an analysis improves
our understanding of the factors that determine pay changes around acquisition. We find no
evidence that pay changes are affected by target nationality or organizational form. However,
initial cross-border acquisitions, which presumably have a marginally greater impact on
international exposure than subsequent acquisitions, do result in significantly higher pay. Since
the previous studies above do not consider the impact of different forms of geographic
expansion on executive pay, this result enhances our understanding of the mechanism through
which such impacts occur. We find that although pay changes are significantly higher when the
target company has relatively high pay, acquisitions in high pay countries do not result in higher
5pay. Our third contribution is to examine a key theme in the literature, namely the motivation of
acquirers to make poor acquisitions because of executive pay considerations. In contrast to
previous studies, we do so for a comprehensive sample, examining whether the propensity to
acquire depends on prior acquisition pay awards, and whether bad acquisitions result in pay
increases and an overall increase in CEO wealth. We find that propensity to acquire is higher
following high pay awards, and that even bad acquisitions result in pay increases, although such
increases are far outweighed by declines in CEO share values. Finally, we contribute to the
literature by examining whether weak corporate governance results in higher pay awards and
hence whether such awards are a manifestation of agency problems. We find no evidence of this.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I describes the econometric methodology and the
data. In Section II we present the empirical results. Section III concludes.
I. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To test for the existence of a relationship between top executive compensation and acquisitions
we build on a basic relationship between executive pay and the various determinants which have
been identified as important in the literature on executive pay (see e.g., Girma et al., 2006). This
basic relationship may be written as follows:
ln Pay it = β 0 + β1 ln Pay it-1 + β2 ln Sales it + β3 ROA it
(1) + β4 MTBV it + β5 Acquisition it + f i + h t + e it
where Pay it is defined as the total cash compensation (salary plus bonus) of the highest paid
director in company i at time t. Pay it-1 is the lagged value of variable Pay it. The impact
coefficient β1 gives an estimate of the degree of top pay persistence. Previous studies have
shown that there is significant persistence in top pay (Conyon, 1997; Girma et al., 2006) and
therefore it needs to be controlled for. Sales it represents firm sales and is our measure of
company size, which is necessary to control for since most compensation studies have found a
positive relation between compensation and firm size. ROA it is the accounting return on assets,
computed as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Agency theories
6predict that firm performance will be positively correlated with compensation. MTBV it is the
market to book value. Acquisition it is a set of dummy variables for the years surrounding
acquisition. It may take time for the effects of acquisition on pay to be observable (Girma et al.,
2006) and therefore separate acquisition variables were defined for the year following
acquisition and then for each of the following two years to capture lagged effects. Additionally,
to examine whether any pay effects are the result of the acquisition and not the continuation of a
pre-merger trend, acquisition variables were also defined for the two years preceding acquisition
to capture lead effects. f i are firm specific fixed effects which are included to purge from the
estimated equation any unobserved time invariant company factors that may contaminate the
estimation of the pay regression. h t are year dummies employed to account for economy-wide
shocks, and e it is an error term.
With regard to our measure of executive pay, we follow other UK executive pay work (see,
e.g., Girma et al., 2006) in defining CEO compensation as the reported emoluments (salary plus
bonus plus the cash equivalents of any perquisites but excluding pension contributions) of the
highest paid director. Until 1997, this was the only widely available measure of CEO pay.
Although it has been possible since 1997 to identify the specific components of compensation
(such as stock options) received by each board member, given the econometric model employed
here (which requires 2 years of lagged compensation) any analysis involving this more recent
data would be restricted to years 1999-2001 only. Hence for almost all our sample period, the
reported pay plus bonus of the highest paid director is the only measure of compensation
available and subsequently the only measure employed. We expect any bias introduced by not
examining long term incentives to be minimal. For most of the sample period, maximum option
grants were tied to base salary and hence were not an independent element of salary and the
evidence suggests that long term incentives form only a small part of executive compensation
(Conyon and Murphy, 2000).
The presence of a lagged dependent variable in panel data models renders the conventional
fixed effects estimator biased (Nickell, 1981). To avoid this problem, we adopt the first
7difference transformation of equation (1) to eliminate the company specific fixed effects as
originally suggested by Anderson and Hsaio (1982) as follows:
∆ ln Pay it = β0 + β1 ∆ ln Pay it-1 + β2 ∆ ln Sales it + β3 ∆ ROA it
(2) + β4 ∆ MTBV it + β5 Acquisition it + f i + h t + e it
where the operator ∆ on any variable X is simply current value X minus last period value (that
is, ∆ X = X t – X t-1).
Taking first differences as in equation (2) induces an MA(1) error term, and therefore
estimation of this dynamic panel data model by least squares results in biased estimates on the
lagged dependent variable, β1 (Nickell, 1981). We employ instrumental variable techniques to
avoid such problems. The MA(1) error structure suggests that under the null of no serial
correlation, valid instruments are those dated t-2 and earlier. We instrument ∆ ln Pay it-1 with
lags of pay in levels (ln Pay it-2), sales (ln Sales it-2), profitability (ROA it-2), MTBV (MTBV it-2),
and year dummies.8 This approach has been used by previous empirical pay studies in the UK
(Main et al., 1996; Conyon, 1997; and Girma et al., 2006). We estimate the model using the
Arrellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure as contained in
the econometric programme Stata. This yields valid instrumental variable estimates in the
absence of second-order serial correlation. The validity of the instrument set and the success of
the instrumentation process in purging the estimates of second order serial correlation are
examined using the Sargan test of instrument validity and a test for second order serial
correlation, respectively.
The data used in this analysis is derived from two separate sources. The first source is
Datastream, from which director compensation, sales, profitability and MTBV are derived.
Three successive years of data are required because the regression model described in equation
(2) requires two years of lagged data. It was therefore necessary to exclude from the Datastream
population of UK public firms those firms lacking three continuous years of director
compensation, sales, profitability, and MTBV over the period 1982-2001. Our pay model is
estimated from 1984 to 2001, but for 1984 observations we require data going back to 1982. Our
8final sample consists of an unbalanced panel (i.e., differing time series observations per
company) of 2,471 companies between 1984 and 2001 for which we have 19,565 firm year
observations. The balance of the panel is shown in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1 HERE
Two secondary datasources, Thomson Financial SDC Mergers Database and the Thomson
Financial magazine Acquisitions Monthly, were then used to attempt to identify every
acquisition made by the sample firms over the period January 1st 1984 to December 31st 2001.
Acquisitions are defined as occurring when the bidder owns less than 50% of the target’s voting
shares before the takeover, and increases its ownership to at least 50% as a result of the
takeover. We adopt a materiality constraint that limits our sample to acquisitions in which the
target’s acquisition value is at least 5% of the acquiring firm’s market value in the acquisition
month.9
Our final sample consists of 4,528 acquisitions, carried out by 1,408 acquirers. The balance
of the panel for acquirers and non-acquirers is shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. The
annual breakdown of the sample acquisitions is reported in Table 2, and is broken down
according to whether the target company is a UK or foreign firm, or a public or private firm. Of
the 4,528 acquisitions, 29 percent are acquisitions of cross-border targets. 49 percent of these are
acquisitions of US targets, highlighting the importance of US targets in the cross-border
acquisition activity of UK acquirers. Of the other 660 cross-border acquisitions, the vast
majority (76%) involve European targets. Only 17 percent of the sample acquisitions involve
public targets. Acquisitions of domestic public targets, the type of acquisition that previous
studies have focused on, account for only 13 percent of the sample.
TABLE 2 HERE
Table 3 below reports the absolute size of the different types of acquisitions. Total deal value
is the total value of all transactions. Deal size is the value of the transaction. Acquirer size is the
acquirer’s market value at the start of the announcement month. Relative size is deal size
divided by acquirer size.10 Domestic targets tend to be smaller in absolute terms but larger in
9relative terms than cross-border targets, whilst public targets tend to be larger in both absolute
and relative terms than private targets.
TABLE 3 HERE
Table 4 below presents the summary statistics for the continuous variables (compensation,
sales, profitability and MTBV) used in the regression analysis.
TABLE 4 HERE
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Column (1) of Table 5 below reports the results of estimating equation (2). The coefficient for ∆ 
ln Pay it-1 is significantly positive, indicating that changes in pay are positively related to prior
compensation levels. The coefficient for ∆ ln Sales it is significantly positive. The coefficient for
∆ ROA it is insignificantly positive, whilst the coefficient for ∆ MTBV it is insignificantly
negative. These results are robust and hold throughout the rest of the analysis. Diagnostics for
the instrument set are satisfactory. Both the Sargan p-value and the 2nd order serial correlation p-
value are insignificant (p-values of 0.4609 and 0.2032 respectively). Again, these values are
similar for the rest of the analysis.11
TABLE 5 HERE
Turning to the impact of acquisition, acquirers experience significantly positive pay changes
in the one and two years prior to acquisition. This is consistent with the evidence of Harford and
Li (2007), who suggest that firms with overpaid CEOs have weak governance, and it is firms
with weak governance who are able to undertake acquisitions. The coefficient for the acquisition
year (Acquisition it) is also significantly positive, but it is not significantly different from the
coefficients for the one and two years prior to acquisition. The coefficient for the second year
following takeover completion (Acquisition it-1) is statistically insignificant, yet the coefficient
for the third year following completion (Acquisition it-2) is significantly negative and of a similar
magnitude to the positive coefficient for the acquisition year.12 Therefore for the overall sample
of acquisitions, there is a positive change following acquisition, yet it is no different from the
changes prior to acquisition and is reversed in the third year following acquisition.
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We now examine whether this conclusion depends on the size of the target company, both in
relation to the acquirer and in absolute terms. If size increases associated with acquisition
growth are rewarded more highly than size increases associated with internal growth, then the
larger the acquisition size (and the relative size) the more positive the effect on pay.
Firstly, we examine the effect of the relative size of the acquisition. Column (2) of Table 5
shows the results of a regression which relative size is included as an explanatory variable. The
relative size coefficient is significantly positive in the year following completion and the
subsequent year. However, for the third year following completion it is significantly negative.
Acquisition relative size therefore determines both the pay increase in the acquisition year and
also the subsequent decline in pay. Column (3) reports the results for a regression in which the
acquisition dummy variables employed only include acquisitions with a relative size greater than
20%. The pre-merger year coefficients are similar to those in Column (1) but statistically
insignificant. However, the coefficient for the acquisition year is significantly positive and much
larger than in Column (1). It is significantly different from the coefficients for the two years
prior to acquisition. Again, the coefficient for the third year following completion is
significantly negative.
Secondly, we examine how pay changes around acquisition are related to the overall sales
change of the acquirer, and the acquired sales of the target. This approach is similar to that of
Girma et al. (2006), who dissect annual sales changes into those associated with acquired sales
and internally generated sales. Target company sales data is available for only a subset (2,238)
of the sample acquisitions. To estimate sales for the remaining 2,290 targets for which sales is
unavailable, we firstly estimate the median transaction value to sales multiple for the 2,238
acquisitions, which is equal to 0.89. Secondly, for the other targets we divide their transaction
value by 0.89 for the estimated sales value.13 The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 5.
The coefficient for acquired sales is significantly positive for the acquisition year, and
significantly negative for the third year following acquisition. Since this regression already
includes the change in acquirer sales, size increases through acquisition are clearly rewarded
11
significantly more than size increases through internal growth,14 consistent with Girma et al.,
(2006). Column (5) reports the results for a regression in which the acquisition dummy variables
employed only include acquisitions with an absolute size of sales greater than £500m. The
coefficient for the acquisition year is significantly positive and significantly larger than the
coefficients for the two years prior to acquisition, whilst the coefficient for the third year is
significantly negative.
Therefore, acquisitions beyond a certain relative and absolute size have a significantly
positive impact in the acquisition year, even relative to the positive pre-merger trend. However,
the pay increase in year of acquisition appears to reverse consistently two years later. This
suggests that the initial increase is a transitory one. One reason could be that the increase
represents an increase in bonus and not salary. This explanation would be consistent with the US
evidence of Grinstein and Hribar (2004) who show that pay increases following mergers tend to
be one off bonus payments.15
A potential selection bias exists in our regressions because acquiring firms are not chosen at
random from the firm population. A specification error will exist if the omitted variables that
determine whether a firm acquires another firm are correlated with those that determine the pay
increase. To address this we use the Heckman (1979) correction. We first run a probit regression
for all sample firms to model the probability that a firm will undertake an acquisition. Our
explanatory variables are pre-merger sales, market to book ratio, ROA, dummy variable for
whether the firm acquired another firm in the previous year, the announcement share return of
that acquisition (further described below), and year dummies. We use the probit estimates to
construct the Heckman variable, which when added to equation (2), corrects for a potential
correlation between the error term in the probit regression and the error term in equation (2). We
include the Heckman variable for the regressions in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 5. This
variable is insignificantly positive and significantly positive respectively in the two regressions.
However, the acquisition dummy variables are of the same magnitude and statistical significance
as in Table 5, suggesting that our results are robust to any specification error.
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Does target nationality and organizational form have an impact on acquisition pay awards?
In order to examine whether a differential impact on pay exists between private and public
acquisitions, we employ an additional set of dummy variables (Acquisition public it) which are
set equal to one if the acquisition is public, zero otherwise. Again, we include these variables for
each of the five years surrounding acquisition as in Table 5 above. The importance of
acquisition size in determining pay changes was displayed above, and we subsequently control
for relative size in the rest of the analysis. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 6
below. The coefficients for the public acquisition dummy variable are not significant for any of
the years surrounding acquisition. In order to check the robustness of this finding, in Column (4)
we restrict all acquisitions to be greater than 20% in terms of relative size. Again, the
coefficients are not significant. There does not, therefore, appear to be a significant difference
between private and public acquisitions in terms of executive pay impacts.
TABLE 6 HERE
In order to examine whether domestic and cross-border acquisitions have differential pay
impacts, we employ a set of dummy variables (Acquisition cross-border it) which are set equal to
one if the acquisition is cross-border, zero if domestic. In Column (2) of Table 6, we report the
results of these regressions. The only coefficient that is significant (at the five percent level) is
for the third year following acquisition (significantly negative). The same result holds when we
restrict all acquisitions to be greater than 20% in terms of relative size, as shown in Column (5).
In Columns (3) and (6) of Table 5 we include dummy variables for both cross-border and public
acquisitions. However, this makes no difference to our conclusions regarding the pay impact of
cross-border versus domestic (or public versus private) acquisitions. Therefore, the only
difference that we find between cross-border and domestic acquisitions is that the former
experience a significantly greater decline in pay in the second year following acquisition.16 This
finding runs contrary to the hypotheses described in the Introduction, which predict that cross-
border deals will have more positive pay impacts than domestic acquisitions. However, these
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hypotheses predict that specific types of cross-border acquisitions will have larger pay impacts
than others, and we therefore examine such types in more detail.
One may expect initial cross-border acquisitions by firms to have larger pay impacts, since
initial cross-border acquisitions may have a marginally greater impact on the multinational
nature and complexity of the firm, compared to subsequent cross-border acquisitions. In order to
examine this, we employ a dummy variable which is equal to one if an acquisition is the first
cross-border acquisition carried out by a acquiring company, zero otherwise. The results,
reported in Column (1) of Table 7 below, show that the coefficient for the acquisition year is
insignificantly positive. In Column (4) we restrict all acquisitions to be greater than 20% in
terms of relative size. In this case, the coefficient for the acquisition year is significantly
positive. Other coefficients are insignificant. Therefore, for relatively large acquisitions, initial
cross-border acquisitions result in significantly higher changes than subsequent cross-border
acquisitions. To ensure that this is not a general bid order effect, we repeat the analysis for initial
domestic acquisitions, but find no similar effect.17 Since previous pay studies that examine the
impact of multi-nationality do not examine different forms of geographic expansion, these
results improve our understanding of the mechanism through which international exposure
affects pay.
TABLE 7 HERE
One of the hypotheses advanced for higher pay impacts in cross-border deals is that cross-
border acquisitions of targets in countries with relatively high pay will result in higher pay
changes. To test this, we examine the differential impact of cross-border acquisitions of US
targets, since the US has substantially higher pay levels than the UK and represents a significant
proportion of the sample. We employ a dummy variable that is given the value one for US
acquisitions, zero otherwise. The results, reported in Column (2) of Table 7, show that none of
the coefficients for this variable are significant. Column (5) reports results for acquisitions
which are greater than 20% in terms of relative size, yet the results are the same. We therefore
14
find no evidence that cross-border acquisitions of targets in high pay countries result in higher
pay changes than other cross-border acquisitions.
We examine the key assumption underlying this hypothesis by examining the impact of target
executive pay levels on acquirer pay impacts. Target pay data is only available for UK public
targets (collected from Datastream) and US public target data (collected from 14A company
filings on the SEC Edgar Database). We collect the highest paid director’s cash compensation
(salary and bonus) for 527 UK public targets and 41 US public targets. For every deal year, we
create a dummy variable which is set equal to one if the target highest director pay is higher than
the acquirer’s highest director pay, zero otherwise. Of the 568 acquisitions with data available,
112 have target pay greater than the acquirer pay. The results are shown in Column (3) of Table
7. The coefficient for this dummy variable for the second year following acquisition is
significantly positive, whilst coefficients for other years are statistically insignificant. Column
(6) reports regressions for acquisitions which are greater than 20% in terms of relative size. The
results are again very similar. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that where the
acquirer's level of pay is lower than that of the acquiree, there is a tendency for the acquirer's
pay to gravitate towards the acquiree's levels following acquisition
Are CEOs really motivated to carry out (bad) acquisitions by executive pay considerations?
In this section, we examine whether acquisition propensity is influenced by prior acquisition pay
awards and whether executive pay and CEO wealth increases following poor acquisitions.
If CEOs carry out acquisitions in order to increase pay, then it follows that those CEOs who
have been most highly compensated for past acquisitions may be more likely to make future
acquisitions. We estimate a logit model in which the dependent variable is one if a firm carries
out an acquisition in the next financial year, zero otherwise. We include sales, profitability, and
MTBV as independent variables since previous studies show they impact positively on
acquisition propensity (Hughes, 1989). We allow for the fact that some firms are predisposed to
make acquisitions by including a dummy variable set equal to one if there is an acquisition in the
current year, zero otherwise. The quality of a previous merger may affect acquisition propensity
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and we therefore include current year acquisition performance, measured as the cumulative
announcement returns (CARs) to the acquiring firm for the 3-day period (-1, 1) around the
announcement date (see e.g., Girma et al., 2006), where the benchmark return is the Datastream
equal weighted market index. If there is more than one acquisition within the year, we use the
sum of CARs. We use two compensation measures as explanatory variables. Firstly, we estimate
equation (2) without the acquisition variables, and use the residuals as a measure of abnormal
compensation (Abnormal pay). Secondly, to measure prior acquisition abnormal pay we use
abnormal pay if there is an acquisition in the current year, zero otherwise (Abnormal pay *
acquisition). The equation we estimate is as follows;
Acquisition it+1 = β 0 + β1 ln Sales it + β2 ROA it + β3 MTBV it
(3) + β4 Acquisition it + β5 CAR it + β6 Abnormal pay it
+ β7 Abnormal pay it * acquisition it + h it + e it
The results, reported in Column (1) of Table 8, show that future acquisition activity is
significantly positively related to prior sales, ROA, MTBV, CAR, prior abnormal pay and
abnormal pay associated with acquisitions. In Column (3) we rerun the regressions for
acquisitions in which relative size is greater than 20%. In this case, the coefficient on Abnormal
pay * acquisition is not statistically significant. Therefore our results are not conclusive here.
TABLE 8 HERE
In order to examine this further we use as our dependent variable not whether an acquisition
is made in the subsequent year but the relative size of that acquisition. The results are reported in
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 8. In this case the coefficient for Abnormal pay * acquisition is
always significantly positive, suggesting that acquirers who earn high abnormal pay from prior
acquisitions are more likely to carry out relatively large future deals. This evidence overall is
consistent with Rosen (2004), who finds that excess pay associated with prior mergers results in
a higher likelihood of future acquisitions.
To examine whether acquirer CEOs are rewarded differently for good and bad acquisitions
we firstly employ a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the acquisition has a negative
16
CAR, zero otherwise.18 We include this variable for both the acquisition year and the subsequent
two years to allow for lag effects. The results, reported in Column (1) of Table 9 below, show
that these coefficients are all statistically insignificant. The results in Column (4), for which all
acquisitions must be greater than 20% in terms of relative size, are similar. Secondly, Columns
(2) and (3), report the pay impacts for those acquisitions which have a negative CAR, both with
and without controlling for relative size, respectively. In both columns there is a significantly
positive effect on pay in the year following acquisition, and a significantly negative effect two
years after acquisition. Columns (5) and (6) show similar results for those acquisitions which are
greater than 20% in terms of relative size. These results for negative CAR acquisitions are very
similar to those for the overall sample of acquisitions.19 We therefore find no difference in pay
impacts between good and bad acquisitions, and pay impacts are significantly positive for both
wealth creative and wealth destructive acquisitions.20 This finding has important implications for
the motivations of CEOs carrying out acquisitions, since CEOs appear able to increase their pay,
even if acquisitions destroy shareholder value.
TABLE 9 HERE
Despite this, CEOs may not be motivated to make poor acquisitions if there is an offsetting
negative effect on the value of their own shareholdings, and we therefore examine the overall
effect on both pay and the value of shares and incentive shares. Information on shareholdings for
a subset of acquisitions (1,001 sample acquisitions between 1989 and 1998) is drawn from the
dataset employed by Conn et al. (2007), which contains the number of shares and incentive
shares owned by CEOs in the last financial year prior to the first acquisition in a merger series.
A merger series is defined as one or more mergers followed by a period of at least 36 months
with no mergers. To estimate the impact on share value, we firstly multiply the acquirer’s
market value (at year beginning) by the acquisition CAR, and then multiply this by the
percentage of shares owned. To estimate the impact on incentive share value, we multiply the
former value by the percentage of incentive shares owned. We therefore assume that a 1%
increase (decrease) in share value will increase (decrease) incentive shares by 1%. Our
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estimation of the change in pay due to acquisition is Abnormal pay, as described above. To
estimate the abnormal change in sterling (rather than logs), we multiply the inverse of Abnormal
pay by Pay t-1, and subtract Pay t-1. The impact on overall wealth is the sum of the pay change in
the acquisition year and the change in the value of share and incentive shares. The results for all
acquisitions are shown in Panel A of Table 10, whilst those with a relative size of greater than
20% are shown in Panel B.
TABLE 10 HERE
For all acquisitions, the average abnormal pay increase in the year of acquisition is £21,680.
The average impact on both CEO shareholding value and incentive share value is significantly
positive (£24,180 and £11,750 respectively). However, median impacts are much smaller, and
are much smaller in size than pay impacts. Results in Panel B are very similar. Results for both
panels show no significant difference in pay changes between negative and positive CAR
acquisitions. However, negative CAR acquisitions have a significantly negative effect on the
share and incentive share value, which is greater than the pay increase, such that the average
(median) impact on overall CEO wealth is a statistically significant -£82,590 (-£8,810). In
contrast, positive CAR acquisitions have a significantly positive effect on overall CEO wealth,
with an average (median) increase of £163,020 (£44,540). The difference between negative and
positive CAR acquisitions is statistically significant. A similar pattern is shown in Panel B. Our
results show that CEOs on average suffer a significant decline in wealth from carrying out bad
acquisitions.
Are acquisition pay awards the result of weak corporate governance?
We examine whether the pay changes around acquisition are the result of agency problems by
examining whether they are larger for acquirers with weak corporate governance. We employ
seven corporate governance measures comprising board size, proportion of non-executive
directors, CEO tenure as board director, whether the CEO is also chairman, CEO share
ownership, board share ownership, and off board ownership. The first two measures, board size
and the number of non-executive directors are collected from Datastream. Board size is
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available for the entire sample, and the number of non-executive directors is available for 14,958
firm year observations. The other five measures are drawn from the dataset employed by Conn
et al., (2007) described above.21
We test the impact of each governance variable separately on the pay changes around
acquisition, by classifying acquirers according to whether they have weak governance as
follows; Board size greater than median board size (7) for all sample observations; Acquirer
proportion of non-executives less than median (0.40) for 14,958 sample observations; Acquirer
CEO tenure greater than median acquirer (3.93 years); Acquirer CEO also Chairman; Acquirer
CEO ownership less than median acquirer (0.5%); Acquirer board ownership less than median
acquirer (7.6%); Acquirer largest off board holding less than median acquirer (10.0%). We run
seven separate regressions identical to Column (2) of Table 5, in which we include an additional
dummy variable which is equal to the acquisition dummy variable if the acquirer has weak
corporate governance for the particular variable, and zero otherwise. The acquisition dummy
variables and relative size variables are only set equal to one and the relative size respectively, if
the governance data is available for the firm year observation. The results are reported in Table
11 below. Panel A reports results for all acquisitions, whilst Panel B reports results for
acquisitions in which relative size is greater than 20%.
TABLE 11 HERE
There is little evidence that acquirers with weak corporate governance experience larger pay
increases around acquisition. In the year immediately following acquisition, only two of the
seven coefficients are significantly positive. Acquirers with high CEO tenure tend to experience
significantly higher increases in pay. However, this would appear to be the continuation of a
trend because the coefficient for this variable is also significantly positive in the two years prior
to acquisition. Furthermore, the difference between the coefficient for the acquisition year and
the year prior to acquisition is not significant. The other significant coefficient is that for low
external ownership. The results reported in Panel B are similar, although the coefficient for low
external ownership is not significant. Pay changes around acquisition are not significantly
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affected by the strength of corporate governance, and hence would not appear to be a
manifestation of weak corporate governance.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In this study we examine the impact of a comprehensive sample of acquisitions on executive
compensation. It is the analysis of this comprehensive sample, which includes foreign, domestic,
public and private acquisition targets, that marks our key contribution to the literature. Previous
studies in contrast examine only acquisitions of domestic public targets, which account for less
than 13 percent of our sample. Ours is the first study therefore to provide evidence on
acquisition pay impacts which are robust to the inclusion of all acquisition types. We find that
acquisitions result in significant pay increases in the year following acquisition, but that the
increase is transitory and offset by a similar decline two years after acquisition, consistent with
the initial increase representing a one off bonus payment rather than a permanent salary increase.
A number of reasons have been advanced as to why cross-border and public acquisitions will
have relatively high pay impacts. We provide the first comparison of these different types of
acquisition. Although cross-border acquisitions increase international exposure, and such
exposure is linked generally to higher pay, we find no evidence of higher pay increases relative
to domestic acquisitions. However, we do find that initial cross-border acquisitions, which
presumably have a greater impact on the firm’s international exposure than subsequent ones,
result in higher pay changes. Therefore, cross-border acquisitions do appear to have a larger
impact on pay when increases in international exposure are important. We find no evidence of
differences between public and private acquisitions.
We find that acquisitions of target firms with higher pay levels than the acquirer result in
higher pay changes. Since the majority of cross-border targets are from the US, which has higher
pay levels than the UK, one may expect to observe higher pay increases following US
acquisitions, yet we find no evidence of this. Such pay disparities between acquirer and target do
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not appear frequent enough to affect average outcomes, and as such, mergers are unlikely to
bring about convergence of UK executive pay levels to US levels as some authors have argued.
One of the primary considerations of the extant literature is whether motivations exist to
make acquisitions, even wealth destructive ones, because of executive pay considerations. Ours
is the first study to consider these issues for a comprehensive acquisition sample. We find that
acquirers that are paid more following acquisition are more likely to carry out future and
relatively large acquisitions. There is no evidence that pay changes are related to acquisition
performance, and bad and good acquisitions result in similar pay increases. However, in wealth
destroying acquisitions, the decline in CEO share value far outweighs the increase in executive
pay and therefore distorted incentives do not appear to exist, given average CEO shareholdings,
for acquirers to pursue wealth destroying acquisitions. Finally, we find no evidence that pay
awards around acquisition are greater when corporate governance is weaker, and therefore no
evidence that acquisition pay awards are a manifestation of poor corporate governance.
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FIGURE 1
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CEO PAY LEVELS AND STRUCTURES
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Note: Data from Towers Perrin’s Worldwide Total Reward report, 1999. Data reflects Towers Perrin’s estimate of
CEO pay as of April 1999 for industrial companies with approximately US $250 million in annual revenues.
TABLE 1
BALANCE OF THE PANEL, 1984-2001
Number of data observations Number of companies Acquirers Non-acquirers
1 294 87 207
2 238 66 172
3 250 101 149
4 220 108 112
5 143 71 72
6 136 74 62
7 112 74 38
8 64 44 20
9 86 57 29
10 94 68 26
11 90 61 29
12 95 76 19
13 75 56 19
14 76 62 14
15 95 78 17
16 72 60 12
17 44 36 8
18 285 229 56
Total 2,469 1,408 1,061
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TABLE 2
FREQUENCY OF SAMPLE ACQUISITIONS, BY TYPE, 1984-2001
Year All
acquisitions
Domestic
public
Domestic
private
Cross-border
public
Cross-border
private
1984 11 0 5 2 4
1985 100 50 28 1 21
1986 193 63 80 6 44
1987 271 65 139 10 57
1988 425 51 266 19 89
1989 367 44 211 17 95
1990 277 26 160 6 85
1991 196 21 121 2 52
1992 183 19 118 3 43
1993 213 20 141 4 48
1994 283 22 196 6 59
1995 261 28 157 5 71
1996 288 19 190 8 71
1997 312 29 191 10 82
1998 303 34 172 12 85
1999 302 41 166 25 70
2000 331 35 172 25 99
2001 212 12 143 6 51
Total 4,528 579 2,656 167 1,126
TABLE 3
SIZE OF SAMPLE ACQUISITIONS, BY TYPE
All
acquisitions
Domestic
public
Domestic
private
Cross-border
public
Cross-border
private
Observations 4,528 579 2,656 167 1,126
Total deal value (£ billion) 267,802 76,597 69,213 40,183 81,810
Deal size (£ million) mean 61 134 27 247 75
Acquirer size (£ million) mean 299 496 137 1,115 448
Relative size mean 0.33 0.56 0.31 0.39 0.22
TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF CONTINUOUS REGRESSION VARIABLES
Variable Observations Mean Median Standard
deviation
1st quartile 3rd quartile
Pay 19,565 239.69 162.42 233.45 102.77 281.25
Sales 19,565 528,104.72 78,007.91 1,310,667.50 24,897.99 289,903.14
ROA 19,565 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.14
MTBV 19,565 2.53 1.69 5.35 0.95 3.03
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TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: RESULTS FOR THE OVERALL
SAMPLE AND THE IMPACT OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE TARGET SIZE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.027** 0.050*** 0.031***
(4.58) (4.67) (2.49) (4.51) (2.77)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.372*** 0.363*** 0.368*** 0.378*** 0.378***
(24.94) (24.27) (24.49) (25.85) (25.53)
∆ ln Sales it 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.114***
(23.18) (22.34) (22.89) (23.02) (23.75)
∆ ROA it 0.035 0.029 0.035 0.036* 0.039*
(1.59) (1.32) (1.62) (1.66) (1.77)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(0.70) -(0.91) -(0.74) -(0.70) -(0.62)
Acquisition it+2 0.016
** 0.015* 0.017 0.017 0.007
(2.09) (1.73) (1.56) (1.26) (0.27)
Acquisition it+1 0.015
* 0.010 0.016 0.002 0.020
(1.87) (1.12) (1.49) (0.12) (0.72)
Acquisition it 0.025
*** 0.003 0.053*** -0.004 0.071***
(3.25) (0.30) (5.17) -(0.29) (2.61)
Acquisition it-1 0.004 -0.011 0.012 -0.003 0.009
(0.47) -(1.27) (1.12) -(0.20) (0.34)
Acquisition it-2 -0.025
*** -0.004 -0.047*** 0.014 -0.076***
-(3.30) -(0.41) -(4.41) (0.97) -(2.69)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.004
(0.31)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.011
(0.95)
Acquisition relative size it 0.061
***
(5.37)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.044
***
(3.76)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.054
***
-(4.43)
Acquisition size it+2 0.000
-(0.13)
Acquisition size it+1 0.004
(1.12)
Acquisition size it 0.009
**
(2.47)
Acquisition size it-1 0.002
(0.45)
Acquisition size it-2 -0.013
***
-(3.43)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.4609 0.5901 0.5692 0.4340 0.4796
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2032 0.2217 0.2012 0.1590 0.1624
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Column (3) includes all acquisitions with a relative size of greater than 20%. Column (5) includes all acquisitions
with an absolute size in terms of target size of greater than £500m.
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TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE AND CROSS-BORDER VS. DOMESTIC
All acquisitions Acquisitions with relative size >20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(4.61) (4.68) (4.61) (2.53) (2.56) (2.53)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.366*** 0.362*** 0.365*** 0.366*** 0.362*** 0.364***
(24.57) (24.16) (24.48) (24.40) (24.07) (24.34)
∆ ln Sales it 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108***
(22.29) (22.35) (22.29) (22.30) (22.35) (22.27)
∆ ROA it 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.031
(1.31) (1.32) (1.32) (1.43) (1.42) (1.44)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(0.89) -(0.89) -(0.88) -(0.89) -(0.86) -(0.86)
Acquisition it+2 0.014 0.006 0.005 0.014 0.012 0.012
(1.57) (0.58) (0.45) (0.92) (0.72) (0.70)
Acquisition it+1 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.002 0.001 -0.006
(0.77) (1.13) (0.80) (0.13) (0.04) -(0.32)
Acquisition it 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.016 0.008 0.005
(0.24) -(0.34) -(0.39) (1.08) (0.56) (0.34)
Acquisition it-1 -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.020 -0.015 -0.014
-(1.41) -(1.03) -(1.16) -(1.35) -(0.99) -(0.87)
Acquisition it-2 -0.002 0.011 0.014 -0.020 -0.001 -0.003
-(0.20) (1.08) (1.28) -(1.27) -(0.08) -(0.19)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.30) (0.41) (0.39) (0.26) (0.24) (0.27)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.012
(0.75) (0.94) (0.74) (0.78) (0.95) (0.88)
Acquisition relative size it 0.061
*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.053***
(5.25) (5.40) (5.26) (3.95) (4.12) (4.06)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.042
*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049***
(3.56) (3.80) (3.60) (3.66) (3.64) (3.61)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.052
*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.046***
-(4.20) -(4.60) -(4.34) -(3.11) -(3.20) -(3.22)
Acquisition public it+2 0.003 0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.20) (0.33) -(0.06) -(0.03)
Acquisition public it+1 0.017 0.017 0.020 0.021
(1.01) (1.02) (0.94) (0.99)
Acquisition public it 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.011
(0.16) (0.25) (0.44) (0.52)
Acquisition public it-1 0.011 0.010 -0.002 -0.002
(0.63) (0.63) -(0.09) -(0.11)
Acquisition public it-2 -0.014 -0.017 0.009 0.007
-(0.82) -(0.97) (0.41) (0.30)
Acquisition cross-border it+2 0.025
* 0.026* 0.007 0.006
(1.76) (1.77) (0.31) (0.28)
Acquisition cross-border it+1 -0.005 -0.004 0.019 0.020
-(0.32) -(0.27) (0.87) (0.91)
Acquisition cross-border it 0.018 0.018 0.028 0.028
(1.27) (1.25) (1.35) (1.34)
Acquisition cross-border it-1 -0.005 -0.005 -0.017 -0.018
-(0.36) -(0.35) -(0.81) -(0.83)
Acquisition cross-border it-2 -0.044
*** -0.046*** -0.050** -0.051**
-(2.94) -(3.02) -(2.22) -(2.23)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.5763 0.6150 0.6031 0.5984 0.6448 0.6365
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2061 0.2264 0.2099 0.2004 0.2114 0.1968
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Columns (1) to (3) include all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Columns (3) to (6) include all
acquisitions with a relative size of greater than 20%.
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TABLE 7
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE IMPACT OF CROSS-BORDER
ACQUISITION ORDER, TARGET NATIONALITY, AND TARGET EXECUTIVE PAY
All acquisitions Acquisitions with relative size >20%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027**
(4.61) (4.61) (4.59) (2.58) (2.53) (2.47)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.362*** 0.364*** 0.364***
(24.36) (24.46) (24.41) (24.12) (24.32) (24.25)
∆ ln Sales it 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.108***
(22.30) (22.28) (22.27) (22.26) (22.28) (22.27)
∆ ROA it 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.031
(1.35) (1.32) (1.30) (1.45) (1.44) (1.42)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(0.91) -(0.88) -(0.85) -(0.88) -(0.87) -(0.87)
Acquisition it+2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.47) (0.46) (0.43) (0.77) (0.71) (0.68)
Acquisition it+1 0.008 0.008 0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.75) (0.79) (0.71) -(0.32) -(0.32) -(0.42)
Acquisition it -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004
-(0.36) -(0.39) -(0.43) (0.31) (0.34) (0.26)
Acquisition it-1 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.013
-(1.20) -(1.17) -(1.06) -(0.91) -(0.85) -(0.77)
Acquisition it-2 0.014 0.013 0.014 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
(1.28) (1.27) (1.28) -(0.25) -(0.22) -(0.16)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.38) (0.39) (0.41) (0.21) (0.25) (0.27)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.014
(0.76) (0.74) (0.84) (0.86) (0.89) (0.99)
Acquisition relative size it 0.061
*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055***
(5.24) (5.26) (5.29) (4.08) (4.07) (4.18)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.043
*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.046***
(3.62) (3.60) (3.42) (3.64) (3.59) (3.43)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.054
*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.047***
-(4.33) -(4.35) -(4.34) -(3.18) -(3.23) -(3.24)
Acquisition public it+2 0.006 0.005 0.011 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.34) (0.30) (0.61) -(0.05) -(0.05) (0.11)
Acquisition public it+1 0.017 0.017 0.024 0.020 0.021 0.029
(1.00) (1.02) (1.35) (0.94) (0.96) (1.28)
Acquisition public it 0.005 0.004 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.023
(0.29) (0.25) (0.68) (0.66) (0.51) (1.06)
Acquisition public it-1 0.010 0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.002 -0.027
(0.62) (0.66) -(0.60) -(0.14) -(0.11) -(1.18)
Acquisition public it-2 -0.017 -0.016 -0.011 0.008 0.008 0.011
-(0.95) -(0.94) -(0.58) (0.34) (0.35) (0.47)
Acquisition cross-border it+2 0.013 0.017 0.026* 0.017 0.004 0.007
(0.68) (0.90) (1.79) (0.60) (0.14) (0.31)
Acquisition cross-border it+1 0.012 -0.006 -0.003 0.025 -0.009 0.020
(0.64) -(0.33) -(0.21) (0.86) -(0.32) (0.93)
Acquisition cross-border it -0.002 0.019 0.020 -0.020 0.031 0.029
-(0.11) (1.04) (1.39) -(0.70) (1.11) (1.40)
Acquisition cross-border it-1 0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.008 -0.020
(0.09) (0.07) -(0.46) -(0.21) -(0.27) -(0.93)
Acquisition cross-border it-2 -0.050
** -0.042** -0.045*** -0.085*** -0.041 -0.050**
-(2.36) -(2.15) -(2.96) -(2.59) -(1.32) -(2.21)
Acquisition 1st cross-border it+2 0.026 -0.024
(1.06) -(0.66)
Acquisition 1st cross-border it+1 -0.028 -0.012
-(1.20) -(0.33)
Acquisition 1st cross-border it 0.036 0.082**
(1.58) (2.43)
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Acquisition 1st cross-border it-1 -0.007 -0.011
-(0.29) -(0.31)
Acquisition 1st cross-border it-2 0.009 0.062
(0.34) (1.60)
Acquisition US it+2 0.017 0.003
(0.71) (0.08)
Acquisition US it+1 0.004 0.054
(0.19) (1.52)
Acquisition US it -0.002 -0.004
-(0.08) -(0.12)
Acquisition US it-1 -0.013 -0.019
-(0.54) -(0.54)
Acquisition US it-2 -0.006 -0.019
-(0.25) -(0.49)
Acquisition high pay it+2 -0.038 -0.022
-(0.92) -(0.46)
Acquisition high pay it+1 -0.040 -0.042
-(1.00) -(0.89)
Acquisition high pay it -0.054 -0.082
*
-(1.39) -(1.78)
Acquisition high pay it-1 0.141
*** 0.153***
(3.53) (3.21)
Acquisition high pay it-2 -0.044 -0.033
-(1.00) -(0.62)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.5985 0.5966 0.6189 0.6341 0.6373 0.6505
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2199 0.2123 0.2071 0.2154 0.1955 0.1978
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Columns (1) to (3) include all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Columns (4) to (6) include all
acquisitions with a relative size of greater than 20%.
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TABLE 8
THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ON ACQUISITION PROPENSITY
All acquisitions Acquisitions with relative size >20%
Acquisition it+1 Relative size it+1 Acquisition it+1 Relative size it+1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -3.655*** 0.050*** -5.274*** 0.052***
-(20.85) (3.99) -(8.86) (4.14)
ln Sales it 0.066
*** -0.002** 0.020* -0.002***
(7.15) -(2.21) (1.69) -(2.76)
ROA it 0.708
*** -0.131** -0.489** -0.138***
(3.93) -(8.66) -(2.42) -(9.14)
MTBV it 0.008
** 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(2.07) (0.24) -(0.64) (0.04)
Acquisition it 0.781
*** 0.037*** 0.915*** 0.046***
(12.72) (5.47) (9.14) (5.01)
CAR it 2.139
*** 0.138* 2.074** 0.137
(3.52) (1.87) (2.45) (1.54)
Abnormal pay it 0.601
*** 0.010 0.779*** 0.020
(3.22) (0.58) (3.40) (1.19)
Abnormal pay it* acquisition it 0.775
** 0.213*** 0.392 0.221***
(2.34) (5.79) (0.88) (5.03)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0577 0.0198 0.0411 0.0176
No. of observations 17,522 17,522 17,522 17,522
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Columns (1)-(2) include all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Columns (3)-(4) include all
acquisitions with a relative size of greater than 20%.
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TABLE 9
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE IMPACT OF ACQUISITION
PERFORMANCE
All acquisitions Acquisitions with relative size >20%
All
acquisitions
Acquisitions with
negative CAR
All
acquisitions
Acquisitions with
negative CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(4.67) (2.78) (2.59) (2.55) (2.68) (2.56)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.363*** 0.373*** 0.370*** 0.363*** 0.371*** 0.369***
(24.28) (24.97) (24.56) (24.14) (24.75) (24.45)
∆ ln Sales it 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.113*** 0.111***
(22.32) (23.58) (22.99) (22.36) (23.46) (22.97)
∆ ROA it 0.029 0.037* 0.033 0.031 0.037* 0.034
(1.34) (1.69) (1.50) (1.44) (1.69) (1.55)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(0.90) -(0.65) -(0.77) -(0.89) -(0.70) -(0.77)
Acquisition it+2 0.015* 0.004 0.002 0.014 0.016 0.018
(1.73) (0.39) (0.14) (0.96) (1.06) (0.85)
Acquisition it+1 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.009 -0.004
(1.12) (1.22) (0.58) (0.55) (0.61) -(0.19)
Acquisition it 0.005 0.021
** 0.000 0.017 0.054*** 0.029
(0.51) (2.07) (0.02) (1.12) (3.75) (1.51)
Acquisition it-1 -0.018
* 0.016 0.005 -0.030* 0.025* 0.003
-(1.76) (1.52) (0.47) -(1.87) (1.72) (0.16)
Acquisition it-2 0.003 -0.033
*** 0.004 -0.008 -0.057*** 0.009
(0.32) -(3.06) (0.28) -(0.47) -(3.74) (0.44)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.004 0.006 0.004 -0.005
(0.32) (0.31) (0.25) -(0.23)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.017
(0.95) (0.66) (0.85) (0.87)
Acquisition relative size it 0.061
*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.033*
(5.37) (3.10) (3.99) (1.75)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.043
*** 0.035*** 0.049 0.035***
(3.70) (3.28) (3.62) (3.11)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.054
*** -0.090*** -0.043*** -0.092***
-(4.38) -(5.33) -(3.01) -(4.69)
Acquisition CAR<0 it -0.006 0.002
-(0.45) (0.10)
Acquisition CAR<0 it-1 0.017 0.022
(1.27) (1.14)
Acquisition CAR<0 it-2 -0.017 -0.021
-(1.19) -(1.02)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.5899 0.4897 0.5749 0.6134 0.5533 0.5944
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2259 0.1925 0.2230 0.2162 0.1918 0.2338
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Columns (1) to (3) include all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Columns (4) to (6) include all
acquisitions with a relative size of greater than 20%. In addition, Columns (1) and (4) include all acquisitions,
whilst Columns (2) to (3) and (5) to (6) include all acquisitions with negative CARs.
29
TABLE 10
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON CEO WEALTH
Change in pay Change in
share value
Change in
incentive share
value
Total change in
wealth
Panel A: All acquisitions
All deals No. of observations 851 851 851 851
Mean 21.68*** 24.18*** 11.75*** 57.61***
Median 12.04*** 0.02*** 0.00*** 17.09***
Negative CAR No. of observations 343 343 343 343
Mean 21.90*** -88.64*** -15.86*** -82.59***
Median 11.82*** -9.15*** -1.50*** -8.81***
Positive CAR No. of observations 469 469 469 469
Mean 21.12*** 108.65*** 33.25*** 163.02***
Median 11.60*** 6.38*** 2.96*** 44.54***
Difference Mean 0.79 -197.29*** -49.11*** -245.61***
Median 0.22 -15.53*** -4.46*** -53.35***
Panel B: Acquisitions with relative size >20%
All deals No. of observations 362 362 362 362
Mean 19.98*** 54.77* 11.68* 86.43***
Median 11.73*** 0.00 0.00 13.19***
Negative CAR No. of observations 158 158 158 158
Mean 19.44*** -110.04*** -28.06*** -118.65***
Median 11.86*** -11.29*** -1.57*** -18.62***
Positive CAR No. of observations 187 187 187 187
Mean 18.91*** 198.71*** 45.42*** 263.04***
Median 10.57*** 10.19*** 1.12*** 46.53***
Difference Mean 0.53 -308.75*** -73.47*** -381.69***
Median 1.29 -21.48*** -2.69*** -65.15***
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Panel A includes all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Panel B includes all acquisitions with a
relative size of greater than 20%.
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TABLE 11
THE EFFECT OF ACQUISITIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: THE IMPACT OF THE STRENGTH OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Panel A: All Acquisitions
Board size Proportion
of non-
executives
CEO
tenure
Chairman
-CEO
CEO
ownership
Board
ownership
External
ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.052*** 0.027** 0.028** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(4.67) (2.48) (2.52) (3.03) (3.03) (3.04) (3.03)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.363*** 0.365*** 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.372*** 0.369*** 0.370***
(23.96) (24.26) (24.85) (24.48) (24.61) (24.45) (24.44)
∆ ln Sales it 0.109
*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(22.31) (22.53) (23.02) (23.11) (23.04) (23.08) (23.15)
∆ ROA it 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.033
(1.33) (1.33) (1.51) (1.48) (1.55) (1.49) (1.50)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
-(0.91) -(0.83) -(0.81) -(0.91) -(1.01) -(0.90) -(0.92)
Acquisition it+2 0.026
** 0.010 -0.011 0.010 0.004 -0.012 0.020
(2.37) (0.86) -(0.53) (0.57) (0.17) -(0.61) (1.03)
Acquisition it+1 -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 0.012
-(0.08) (0.30) -(0.46) -(0.80) (0.13) -(0.27) (0.66)
Acquisition it -0.001 0.014 -0.024 -0.016 -0.041
** -0.016 -0.034*
-(0.08) (1.32) -(1.28) -(1.03) -(2.12) -(0.91) -(1.93)
Acquisition it-1 -0.012 -0.015 -0.006 -0.003 0.013 0.015 -0.002
-(1.10) -(1.33) -(0.32) -(0.21) (0.69) (0.92) -(0.11)
Acquisition it-2 0.006 -0.014 0.010 -0.002 0.011 0.003 0.000
(0.49) -(1.25) (0.50) -(0.10) (0.56) (0.18) (0.02)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.002 0.013 0.036 0.015 0.034 0.017 0.013
(0.13) (0.97) (1.35) (0.78) (1.50) (0.85) (0.68)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.013 0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.037 -0.006 -0.007
(1.09) (0.80) -(0.36) -(0.29) -(1.65) -(0.30) -(0.37)
Acquisition relative size it 0.061
*** 0.056*** 0.106*** 0.085*** 0.132*** 0.085*** 0.087***
(5.39) (4.74) (4.16) (4.59) (6.22) (4.59) (4.68)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.045
*** 0.044*** -0.003 0.024 -0.013 0.024 0.024
(3.80) (3.73) -(0.13) (1.31) -(0.64) (1.32) (1.31)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.056
*** -0.052*** -0.095*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.060***
-(4.58) -(4.09) -(3.81) -(3.21) -(2.99) -(3.20) -(3.22)
Acquisition weak governance it+2 -0.024 0.006 0.017
** -0.038 -0.003 0.017 -0.044*
-(1.63) (0.35) (2.15) -(1.46) -(0.13) (0.70) -(1.80)
Acquisition weak governance it+1 0.024 0.012 0.016
** 0.040 -0.012 0.010 -0.024
(1.57) (0.75) (1.98) (1.57) -(0.46) (0.40) -(1.02)
Acquisition weak governance it 0.008 -0.021 0.022
*** 0.003 0.036 0.002 0.037*
(0.52) -(1.36) (2.69) (0.15) (1.48) (0.11) (1.67)
Acquisition weak governance it-1 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.009 -0.025 -0.032 0.004
(0.16) (0.17) (0.77) (0.39) -(1.02) -(1.51) (0.19)
Acquisition weak governance it-2 -0.019 0.023 -0.024
*** -0.003 -0.023 -0.012 -0.005
-(1.27) (1.44) -(2.91) -(0.12) -(0.91) -(0.52) -(0.24)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.5898 0.5589 0.4872 0.5735 0.5534 0.5638 0.5615
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2338 0.2123 0.1861 0.1725 0.1844 0.1807 0.1732
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
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Panel B: Acquisitions with relative size >20%
Board size Proportion
of non-
executives
CEO
tenure
Chairman
-CEO
CEO
ownership
Board
ownership
External
ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.028** 0.028** 0.027** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(2.54) (2.54) (2.50) (3.02) (3.03) (3.02) (3.02)
∆ ln Pay it-1 0.362*** 0.364*** 0.368*** 0.370*** 0.373*** 0.370*** 0.370***
(23.92) (24.14) (24.46) (24.46) (24.67) (24.50) (24.46)
∆ ln Sales it 0.109
*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(22.38) (22.52) (22.83) (23.11) (23.09) (23.15) (23.18)
∆ ROA it 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.034 0.034
(1.44) (1.46) (1.57) (1.53) (1.59) (1.56) (1.56)
∆ MTBV it 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
-(0.83) -(0.83) -(0.82) -(0.98) -(1.03) -(0.91) -(0.93)
Acquisition it+2 0.025 0.014 -0.056 0.003 -0.037 -0.021 0.005
(1.50) (0.78) -(1.65) (0.11) -(1.05) -(0.66) (0.14)
Acquisition it+1 -0.002 -0.022 -0.011 -0.004 -0.018 -0.021 0.010
-(0.15) -(1.27) -(0.32) -(0.15) -(0.53) -(0.69) (0.34)
Acquisition it 0.004 0.030
* 0.004 0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.007
(0.27) (1.81) (0.12) (0.13) -(0.26) (0.06) (0.24)
Acquisition it-1 -0.007 -0.014 -0.049 -0.025 -0.008 0.009 -0.036
-(0.44) -(0.86) -(1.62) -(1.02) -(0.28) (0.33) -(1.34)
Acquisition it-2 -0.011 -0.039
*** 0.012 -0.012 0.008 -0.003 -0.006
-(0.66) -(2.24) (0.36) -(0.45) (0.27) -(0.09) -(0.20)
Acquisition relative size it+2 0.001 0.009 0.060
* 0.031 0.054** 0.032 0.028
(0.07) (0.56) (1.94) (1.34) (2.02) (1.38) (1.23)
Acquisition relative size it+1 0.013 0.017 -0.011 -0.011 -0.031 -0.010 -0.012
(0.95) (1.14) -(0.34) -(0.48) -(1.17) -(0.43) -(0.51)
Acquisition relative size it 0.053
*** 0.050*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.119*** 0.068*** 0.069***
(4.08) (3.71) (2.94) (3.14) (4.76) (3.12) (3.15)
Acquisition relative size it-1 0.048
*** 0.048*** 0.016 0.040* -0.003 0.042* 0.041*
(3.61) (3.55) (0.57) (1.86) -(0.11) (1.94) (1.88)
Acquisition relative size it-2 -0.045
*** -0.040*** -0.095*** -0.061*** -0.054** -0.061*** -0.059***
-(3.17) -(2.73) -(3.28) -(2.76) -(2.19) -(2.75) -(2.69)
Acquisition weak governance it+2 -0.026 0.011 0.020
* -0.096** 0.021 -0.014 -0.063*
-(1.22) (0.47) (1.82) -(2.45) (0.52) -(0.38) -(1.73)
Acquisition weak governance it+1 0.025 0.042
* 0.020* 0.037 0.010 0.055 -0.006
(1.15) (1.89) (1.78) (0.95) (0.26) (1.55) -(0.17)
Acquisition weak governance it 0.031 -0.029 0.040
*** 0.036 0.015 0.026 0.015
(1.55) -(1.38) (3.70) (1.00) (0.39) (0.78) (0.44)
Acquisition weak governance it-1 -0.029 -0.014 0.025
** -0.005 -0.021 -0.081** 0.021
-(1.39) -(0.66) (2.26) -(0.14) -(0.57) -(2.51) (0.65)
Acquisition weak governance it-2 -0.011 0.050
** -0.040*** 0.038 -0.050 0.006 0.011
-(0.52) (2.27) -(3.51) (1.08) -(1.33) (0.19) (0.33)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan (p-value) 0.6186 0.5602 0.5686 0.5835 0.5526 0.5665 0.5708
Serial correlation (p-value) 0.2174 0.1995 0.1907 0.1774 0.1818 0.1767 0.1801
No. of observations 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565 19,565
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Panel A includes all acquisitions with a relative size of 5% and greater. Panel B includes all acquisitions with a
relative size of greater than 20%.
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NOTES
1. The positive connection between compensation and firm size can be explained by efficiency reasons such as
matching theory and tournament theory (Rosen, 1992), and in the context of an acquisition because the merger
integration process is more complex and requires more work (Demsetz, 1995).
2. Kroll et al. (1990), Kroll et al. (1997), and Wright et al. (2002) show that a positive relation between
compensation and acquisition performance only holds when corporate governance is strong.
3. Furthermore, they have differential impacts on performance; Cross-border deals under perform domestic deals,
whilst public deals under perform private deals (Conn et al., 2005).
4. Anecdotal evidence of large increases in executive compensation following cross-border acquisitions has caught
the attention of the media. For example, following the cross-border acquisitions of Mannesmann and AirTouch
by Vodafone in 2000, Vodafone CEO Chris Gent was awarded a £10m special bonus which was defended on
the grounds that Vodafone’s executives were poorly paid compared with those in America, and should be
entitled to “catch up” payments (The Economist, 15th July 2000, pp. 20-21).
5. For these reasons some authors have argued that cross-border acquisitions will be a significant factor in causing
executive pay levels to converge over time towards the highest common denominator, in particular that of the
US (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004).
6. Cross-border acquisitions in high pay countries may increase pay because acquirer executives gain the
experience necessary to compete for positions and remuneration at target country firms, or because target
country firms become included as peer group firms used to determine pay levels (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004).
7. Agency-theory models predict that if diffuse private owners find it harder than large private owners to monitor
executive effort, they will need to pay more to induce optimal effort levels (Ke et al., 1999).
8. We employed different instruments for ∆ ln Pay it-1, including a greater number of lags of pay levels (ln Pay it-
3 and ln Pay it-4), and the lagged pay change (∆ ln Pay it-2). The results were similar using these methods.
9. Deal values in foreign currency were converted to sterling using the exchange rate at the announcement month.
10. The variables in Tables 3 and 4, and employed in the subsequent analysis are expressed in 2001 sterling values
(deflated using the UK Retail Price Index) and winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove outliers.
11. In additional tests we employed different explanatory variables. We replaced profitability with the annual share
return, and included the standard deviation of share returns as a risk measure. These variables have coefficients
of 0.028 (p-value of 0.000) and -0.166 (p-value of 0.000) respectively. We also employed industry dummy
variables to control for different industry pay levels. Our key conclusions are not affected by their inclusion.
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12. In additional tests, we also included dummy variables for years t-4, t-3, t+3, and t+4. The coefficients for these
variables were close to zero and statistically insignificant.
13. As a robustness check, we recalculated our results using only the 2,238 acquisitions for which target sales data
is available. The results are very similar.
14. One concern is that acquirer sales will not reflect fully the sales of the new merged entity in the acquisition year
because, under acquisition accounting, target sales are included only from the acquisition date. A significantly
positive coefficient could therefore simply be picking up an effect of sales that will be reflected in following
years. To check this potential bias we employ market and book values instead, yet find very similar results.
15. Girma et al. (2006) find that hostile acquisitions experience a negative impact two years after acquisition.
However, the decline we observe can not be explained by hostile acquisitions, since the decline also holds for
private acquisitions, all of which are friendly in nature.
16. Since target size is an important determinant of pay increases, and target size is greater in public and cross-
border acquisitions, one would expect that public and cross-border acquisitions have a greater impact on pay
when target size is not controlled for. To check this, we estimate Columns (1)-(6) of Table 6 without the
relative size variables. However, the results are very similar to those in Table 6.
17. Since our sample contains multiple acquirers, we examine the relation between pay impacts and the order of an
acquisition within a merger series. Previous studies (see e.g., Conn et al., 2007) have found that performance
impacts decline with acquisition order for multiple acquirers. We include the bid order as an explanatory
variable in Column (1) of Table 5. The coefficient has a value of 0.006 and is statistically insignificant (p-value
of 0.177). Therefore we find no evidence that pay impacts are associated with bid order.
18. The average CAR for the entire sample of acquisitions is 0.96 percent. 51.26 percent of the sample acquisitions
have a positive CAR, whilst 48.74 have a negative CAR.
19. We also examine the relation between pay changes and the CAR itself, thus considering CAR magnitude and
not just its sign. The coefficient for this variable is statistically insignificant (value of 0.24, p-value of 0.79).
20. We re-estimated the regressions in Columns (1) and (4) of Table 8, including dummy variables for public and
cross-border acquisitions, as in Table 6. The coefficients are very similar to those in Table 6, and hence
conclusions on the impact of public and cross-border deals are robust to controlling for acquisition
performance.
21. Data is available for the year prior to acquisition for the following number of acquisitions: CEO tenure (643),
CEO-chairman (1,231), CEO ownership (1,001), board ownership (1,230), and off board ownership (1,230).
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